Greg Detre
Thursday, 16 November, 2000
Mr Snowdon, Mind IV
Can we say what is involved in A�s performing an action?
Does it involve volitions (see Ginet), does it involve tryings (see Hornsby,
OShaughnessy and Smith), must they be intentional under a description
(Davidson, O�Shaughnessy), or can we say none of these things?
What�s involved in performing bodily action:
volition?
then without volition? e.g. Davidson
trying
volition again, Ginet
Is it behaviourist to talk of actions as �bodily events that originate in the agent and have purpose�???
Raising my arm is non-instrumental, but that same action when seen as a policeman directing traffic is instrumental. Isn�t the difference between instrumental and non-instrumental simply one of descriptions?
So, then, non-instrumental actions are ones seen purely in terms of physiology???
Possibly not that simple. Would turning off a light switch (so that I can safely change the bulb) be non-instrumental.
I don�t understand the objection to the first theory relating actions to trying (pg 88). Or the second.
And the third seems fine, because it�s not stipulating an identity, so why do actions and tryings need to match in terms of contingent/necessary success???
When he�s talking about a creature with will but without proprioceptive awareness being unable to direct his will to move his body, is he talking at the neural level too???